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Abstract
Network intrusion detection systems are an active area of research to identify threats that face computer
networks. Network packets comprise of high dimensions which require huge effort to be examined effectively. As
these dimensions contain some irrelevant features, they cause a high False Alarm Rate (FAR). In this paper, we
propose a hybrid method as a feature selection, based on the central points of attribute values and an
Association Rule Mining algorithm to decrease the FAR. This algorithm is designed to be implemented in a short
processing time, due to its dependency on the central points of feature values with partitioning data records into
equal parts. This algorithm is applied on the UNSW-NB15 and the NSLKDD data sets to adopt the highest
ranked features. Some existing techniques are used to measure the accuracy and FAR. The experimental results
show the proposed model is able to improve the accuracy and decrease the FAR. Furthermore, its processing
time is extremely short.
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INTRODUCTION
Attackers attempt to breach computer networks to steal valuable information or disrupt computer resources. A
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) is a powerful defence mechanism that can defend against hostile
threats of attackers (Lee, Stolfo, & Mok, 1999). NIDS methodologies can be classified as Misuse Detection
(MD) and Anomaly Detection (AD) (Moustafa & Slay, 2015a; Valdes & Anderson, 1995; Vigna & Kemmerer,
1999). MD uses signatures of existing attacks to define known attacks. AD creates a normal profile of activities,
and any strong deviations from this profile are considered as an attack. MD reduces False Alarm Rates (FAR),
though it detects existing attacks only. Conversely, AD increases FAR, though it detects novel attacks. As a
result, AD has become a critical point of research to reduce the FAR and increase the detection rate with
identifying both existing and new attacks (Aziz, Azar, Hassanien, & Hanafy, 2014; Garcia-Teodoro, DiazVerdejo, Maciá-Fernández, & Vázquez, 2009).
Network packets consist of multiple features, due to the diversity of involved protocols and services. Some of
these features are redundant or irrelevant. It can be observed that the redundant features are a major reason of
increasing the FAR and decreasing the detection rate. A Feature Selection (FS) is a method of adopting the
relevant features in a data set. The FS also reduces the computational time to implement an online NIDS. The
reliable NIDS depends on removing noisy and redundant features (Hall, 1999).
In this study, we suggest a hybrid method of the Central Points of attribute values and an Association Rule
Mining (ARM) technique. First, the Central Points of attribute values (CP) method mean computing the most
repeated values of each attribute either attribute type is numerical or categorical. Second, the ARM model was
developed to generate the highest correlated values of observations in a data set (Agrawal, Imieliński, & Swami,
1993; Zhang & Zhang, 2002), but we customise it as a feature selection. To establish an effective and reliable
AD, the CP method computes the highest redundant values based on partitioning data observations into equal
parts.as a consequence, this method reduces the processing time of executing the ARM technique.

RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
The goal of ARM makes the strongest itemsets of features via computing support and confidence of rules
(Agrawal et al., 1993; Lee & Stolfo, 1998; Yanyan & Yuan, 2010; Zhang & Zhang, 2002). Many studies have
been suggested to apply ARM techniques in NIDSs. (Agrawal et al., 1993) proposed that program
implementations and user activities can be correlated by using an ARM to create the most frequent attributes.
(Lee & Stolfo, 1998) utilised the ARM to elicit rules for system audit data in order to build a normal user profile,
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any deviation from the profile established new rules. However, in both these studies, the computational time of
the ARM is extremely high. (Yanyan & Yuan, 2010) designed a partition-based ARM model. The model was
customised to scan the training set twice. During the first scan, the data set was divided into several partitions to
be executed easily in memory, whereas during the second scan, the itemsets of the training set were established.
Though, the complexity of this algorithm is highly expensive.
(Su, Yu, & Lin, 2009) developed an incremental fuzzy ARM technique. They used a linked-list method to store
all candidate itemsets and their support in memory. The main disadvantage of this algorithm requires a large-size
memory to store all candidate itemsets. (Nath, Bhattacharyya, & Ghosh, 2011) discussed a survey of existing
feature selection approaches based on ARM methods. Some of the approaches used single objective functions,
while others used with multi-objective. The results showed that the multi-objective ARM can be used to solve
several real datasets. This study is partially related to our work to apply the ARM as feature selection.

DESCRIPTION OF THE NSLKDD DATA SET
A NSLKDD data set is an enhanced version of the KDD99 data set ("NSLKDD," 2015). This data set has four
attack categories: DoS, U2R, R2L and probe; and contains 42 features. In the NSLKDD data set, three major
problems were addressed. First, the repeated observations in training and testing sets were detached to exclude
biasing classification techniques towards the most frequent observations. Second, the training set and testing set
were generated by selecting observations from different parts of the original KDD99 data set. Finally, the
imbalanced of observations in each class either in the training set or testing set were solved to decrease the FAR.
Table 1 shows the distribution of attack and normal records in the NSLKDD data set for the training and testing
sets.
Table 1: NSLKDD Data Set Distribution
Category
DoS
U2R
R2L
Probe
Normal
Total Records

Training set
45,927
52
995
11,656
67,343
125,973

Testing set
7,458
67
2,887
2,422
9,710
22,544

The NSLKDD data set has disadvantages which can negatively affect the fidelity of NIDS evaluation. First,
attack data packets have a time to live value (TTL) of 126 or 253, whilst the packets of the network trafﬁc
mostly have a TTL of 127 or 254. However, TTL values of 126 and 253 do not happen in the training vectors of
the attack types (McHugh, 2000). Second, the probability distribution of the testing set is different from the
probability distribution of the training set, because of inserting new attack vectors in the testing set (Mahoney &
Chan, 2003; Vasudevan, Harshini, & Selvakumar, 2011). This leads to skew or bias classification methods
towards some records rather than balance between the attack and normal vectors. Third, the data set is out-dated;
as a result, it does not a comprehensive representation of contemporary normal and attack vectors (Tavallaee,
Bagheri, Lu, & Ghorbani, 2009).

DESCRIPTION OF THE UNSW-NB15 DATA SET
The UNSW-NB 15 ("UNSW-NB15 data set," 2015) data set was developed by using an IXIA tool to extract a
hybrid of modern normal and modern attack behaviors. This data set involves nine attack categories and 49
features (Moustafa & Slay, 2015b). This data set contains 2, 540,044 observations. A part of this data set was
divided into training and testing sets, reflected in Table 2.
Table 2: A Part of the UNSW-NB15 Data Set Distribution
Category
Normal
Analysis
Backdoor
DoS
Category

Training set
56,000
2,000
1,746
12,264
Training set

Testing set
37,000
677
583
4089
Testing set
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Exploits
Fuzzers
Generic
Reconnaissance
Shellcode
Worms
Total Records

33,393
18,184
40,000
10,491
1,133
130
175,341

11,132
6,062
18,871
3,496
378
44
82,332

The UNSW-NB15 data set has several advantages when compared to the NSLKDD data set. First, it contains
real modern normal behaviors and contemporary synthesised attack activities. Second, the probability
distribution of the training and testing sets are similar. Third, it involves a set of features from the payload and
header of packets to reflect the network packets efficiently. Finally, the complexity of evaluating the UNSWNB15 on existing classification systems showed that this data set has complex patterns. This means that the data
set can be used to evaluate the existing and novel classification methods in an effective and reliable manner.

PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE FOR ADAPTIVE NIDS
In this section, we describe the architecture of adopting the relevant features for each class, whether normal or
abnormal, choose the training and testing sets, execute some classification methods as a decision engine and
evaluate the outcome of the decision engine. Figure 1 represents the procedures of applying the architecture to
execute an adaptive NIDS in a very short time processing as follows:
 Choose an input data set, for example UNSW-NB15 or NSLKDD data set.
 Execute Algorithm 1 to compute the Central Points (CP) of attribute values.
 The CP output is the input of Algorithm 2 to calculate the high ranked attributes.
 Divide the data set into two parts: training set and testing set to learn classifiers.
 Apply EM clustering, Naïve Bayes and Logistic regression techniques as decision engines.
 Evaluate the performance in terms of accuracy and FAR, with respect to the processing time.

Figure 1: The Proposed Architecture for an Adaptive NIDS

Central Points of Attribute Values
To reduce the processing time, the data set records are divided into equal segmentations using Equation 1. The
purpose of the data set partitioning is to be easier during the processing and identify statistical characteristics, for
example mean or mode, from different parts of records. This leads to accomplish the reliability of results by
adopting the relevant attributes.

𝑝 = # 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 =

# 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠

(1)
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In each part of the data set, we compute the mode which is the most frequent value of a feature (Runnenburg,
1978). The attribute values of a network data set could be numeric or categorical, as in the below example.
An example to compute the mode of attribute values
Numeric values
X={1, 2, 1, 1, 3.2, 1}
> mode = {1}
---------------------------------------------------2. Categorical values
Y={‘tcp’, ‘udp’, ‘tcp’, ‘udp’}
> mode = {‘udp’}
1.

In Algorithm 1, the central points of attribute values (mode) are described. In line 1 and 2, the for loops assign
all data values. From line 3 to 12, check attribute values either categorical or numerical, and then compute the
mode for each data part (p). Lines 13 to 17 repeat the steps until finishing all parts. Line 18 retrieves the mode of
all data parts to be input for computing the ARM.

Feature Selection ARM
An ARM (Agrawal et al., 1993; Ma, 1998) is a data mining method to compute the correlation of two or more
than two attributes in a data set, because it can find the strongest itemsets between observations. To explain the
ARM, let 𝑟 = {𝑓1 , 𝑓2 , 𝑓3 , … , 𝑓𝑁 } be a set of features and D be a data set consisting of 𝑇
transactions 𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , 𝑡3 , … . , 𝑡𝑁 . Each transaction 𝑡𝑗 , ∀ 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑁 is a set of features such that 𝑡𝑗 ⊆ 𝑟. The
association rule (𝑓1 (𝑖. 𝑒. , 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) ⟹ 𝑓2 (𝑖. 𝑒. , 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)) subjects to the constraints of (1)∃ 𝑡𝑗 , 𝑓1 , 𝑓2 ∈ 𝑡𝑗 ,
(2)𝑓1 ⊆ 𝑟, 𝑓2 ⊆ 𝑟, and (3)𝑓1 ∩ 𝑓2 ∈ ∅.
The ARM subjects to two methods: support and confidence to create rules. Support determines the frequency of
row values that denotes the association percentage, as reflected in Equation (2). In Equation (3), confidence is
the frequency of a precedent if the antecedent has already occurred.
𝑠𝑢𝑝 (𝑓1 ⟹ 𝑓2 ) =

|#𝑡𝑗|𝑓1 ,𝑓2 ∈𝑡𝑗 |

𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 (𝑓1 ⟹ 𝑓2 ) =

𝑁
|#𝑡𝑗|𝑓1 ,𝑓2 ∈𝑡𝑗 |
|# 𝑡𝑗 |𝑓1 ∈𝑡𝑗 |

(2)
(3)

The ARM finds out all repeated itemsets and identifies the strongest rules in the frequent itemsets. The strongest
ARM in D is realised, if the support of a rule is greater than a user-specified minimum support (𝑠𝑢𝑝 ≥ min𝑠𝑢𝑝),
and confidence of a rule is greater than minimum confidence thresholds (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓 ≥ min𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓).
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It is clear that the CP of attribute values of Algorithm 1 is considered as an input of Algorithm 2 to reduce the
processing time. Algorithm 2 generates the highest ranked attributes based on the ARM. Line 1 is a loop to all
CP. From line 2 to 14, check if the rules do not accomplish the ARM constraints, remove it. Otherwise, compute
support and confidence. In Line 15, all rules order descending based on the values of support and confidence.
From Line 17 to 21, the strongest features are selected based on the number of required features.

Decision Engine Techniques
In the Decision engine, we used Expectation-Maximisation (EM) clustering (Bradley, Fayyad, & Reina, 1998),
Logistic Regression (LR) (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2010) and Naïve Bayes (NB) (Panda & Patra, 2007) techniques.
First, The EM technique maximises the probability density function of a Gaussian distribution to compute the
mean and the covariance of each attribute in a data set. The EM clustering includes two steps: Expectation (Estep) and Maximization (M). In the E-step, the likelihood of observation is calculated, while the M-step reestimates the parameter values from the E-step to accomplish the highest expected outcome. Second, The NB is
a conditional probability model which creates the classification of the two classes: normal (0) or attack (1). It is
computed using the maximum a posterior, as denoted as:
𝑁

𝑃(𝐿|𝐼) = argmax 𝑃(𝐿𝑤 ) ∏
𝑤∈{1,2,..,𝑁}

𝑗=1

𝑃(𝐼𝑗 |𝐿𝑤 ) (4)

such that L denotes the label, I is the observation of each class, w is the class number, P(L|I) refers to the
probability of the class given a specified observation and ∏𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑃(𝐼𝑗 |𝐿𝑤 ) is multiplication of all the probabilities
of the instances conditionally to their classes to achieve the maximum outcome. Third, the LR algorithm
constructs the correlation between a dependent variable (L) and independent variables (F). It utilises the
maximum likelihood function to estimate the regression parameters, as in Equation (4).
Evaluation Criteria
The classification measures are four elements: 𝑇𝑃, 𝑇𝑁, 𝐹𝑃 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑁. First, 𝑇𝑃 (true positive) is the number of
correctly classified attacks. Second, 𝑇𝑁 (true negative) is the number of correctly classified normal records.
Third, 𝐹𝑃 (false positive) is the number of misclassified attacks. Finally, 𝐹𝑁 (false negative) denotes the
number of misclassified normal records. The accuracy is the percentage of the correctly classified records over
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all the rows of data set, whether correctly or incorrectly classified(Moustafa & Slay, 2015a), as reflected in the
following Equation:
𝑎𝑐𝑐 =

𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

(5)

The False Alarm Rate (FAR) reflects the rate of the misclassified to classified records, as in Equation (8).
Equations (6) and (7) calculate False Positive Rate (FPR) and the False Negative Rate (FNR), respectively.
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝐹𝑁
𝐹𝑁𝑅 =
𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃
𝐹𝑃𝑅 + 𝐹𝑁𝑅
𝐹𝐴𝑅 =
2
𝐹𝑃𝑅 =

(6)
(7)
(8)

Precision and recall are computed, as in Equations (9) (10). The precision is the fraction of correctly classified
attacks to all attack records. On the other hand, the recall is the fraction of correctly classified attacks to the
number of correctly classified attacks and misclassified attacks.
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =

𝑡𝑝
𝑡𝑝 + 𝑓𝑝

𝑡𝑝
𝑡𝑝 + 𝑓𝑛

(9)
(10)

The Equations (5) to (8) evaluate the efficiency and reliability of the Decision engine. It is acknowledged that the
highest trusted detection is accomplished, when the accuracy value closes to 100% and FAR closes to 0%.

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The hybrid feature selection is developed using Visual studio C# 2008. Each data set divided into equal parts
using Equation 1. The UNSW-NB15 data set involves 5601 partitions. In contrast, the NSLKDD involves 3072
partitions. Figure 2 represents the construction of the central points of each attribute values, with respect to the
processing time. The parts of the UNSW-NB15 data set consumed about 2 minutes to calculate the most frequent
values for each feature. Conversely, the parts of the NSLKDD data set consumed about 1.4 minutes. This CP
algorithm iteratively generates the highest repeated values to reduce the cost of generating support and
confidence of the ARM.

Figure 2: Data Set Segmentations vs. Processing Time
Algorithm 2 is executed with three different values of minsup and minconf: 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 to estimate the
reliability of outcomes. The goal of selecting these values is that the results of probability could be low (0 - 0.4),
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median (0.4 - 0.6) or high (0.61- 1). Therefore, we consider that the low, median and high probabilities may be
up to 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 in average, respectively. We select some rules based on these probabilities to generate the
most important rules. In Figure 3, some rules and their importance are elicited to choose a set of features for each
class either normal (0) and attack (1). The importance of rules equals the average of support and confidence of a
rule.

Figure 3: A part Of The ARM On The Two Data Sets
Finally, the highest generated attributes from the association rule are ranked. We adopted the highest 11
attributes to ensure at least 25% of all features will be used in the decision engine, as reflected in Table 3. We
attempted to select less than 11 attributes, the evaluation of decision engine techniques were extremely
unsatisfactory. Therefore, it can be observed that 25% of features consider a reliable outcome because all
features are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Table 3 includes the selected 11 features for the
UNSW-NB15 and the NSLKDD data sets.
Table 3: The Adopted Features of the Two Data Sets
UNSW-NB15 Features
state
Dttl
synack
swin
dwin
ct_state_ttl
ct_src_ltm
ct_srv_dst
Sttl
ct_dst_sport_ltm
Djit

NSLKDD Features
dst_bytes
dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate
srv_diff_host_rate
land
dst_host_same_src_port_rate
count
src_bytes
logged_in
protocol_type
num_root
srv_rerror_rate

The evaluation criteria of executing the Expectation-Maximisation clustering (EM), the Logistic Regression
(LR) and the Naïve Bayes (NB) are calculated in terms of accuracy and False Alarm Rate (FAR) to evaluate the
complexity of these data sets, as referred in Table 4.
Table 4: The Evaluation of the Two Data Sets
UNSW-NB15
NSLKDD
Accuracy
FAR
Accuracy
FAR
EM
77.2
13.1
74.4
14.2
LR
83.0
14.2
82.1
17.5
NB
79.5
23.5
28.9
61.4
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The LR produces the best results on the two data sets. On the contrary, the NB reflects the worst outcome on the
two data sets. In a general overview, the accuracy and FAR of these techniques on the UNSW-NB15 attributes
are better than the NSLKDD attributes. Further, in the techniques, the precision and recall on the UNSW-NB15
data set are higher than on the NSLKDD data set, as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Precision and Recall of the Two Data Sets
To clarify why UNSW-NB15 data set has a better assessment than the NSLKDD, there are two main reasons.
First, the NSLKDD data set has many features have the majority of value ‘0’ whether in the observations of
normal or abnormal, so the decision engine techniques are not able to distinguish between normal and attack
observations. However, the UNSW-NB15 has a wide variety of values that represent the nature of modern real
network in which these values are similar for attack and normal records. Second, the data distribution of
NSLKDD data set in the training and testing set is different, due to the addition of new attacks to the testing set.
Conversely, the data distribution of UNSW-NB15 data set in the training and testing set is similar, because of all
observations were generated from a same test-bed.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a hybrid feature selection technique based on the central points (CP) of attribute values
and Association Rule Mining (ARM). The CP helps to reduce the processing time overall by selecting the most
frequent values. The ARM is customised to choose the highest ranked features by removing irrelevant or noisy
features. This algorithm is executed on the UNSW-NB15 and the NSLKDD data set. To discriminate between
attack and normal records, the EM clustering, Logistic Regression and Naïve Bayes are used. The results show
that, the evaluation of the UNSW-NB15 data set is better than the NSLKDD. Ultimately, the proposed feature
selection technique has two advantages: reduce processing time and improve the evaluation of decision engines.
In the future, we plan to enhance the algorithm by adding steps that help in reducing the processing time of
similar values.
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